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READING ADAM SMITH:  UNDERSTANDING THE 
MISINTERPRETATIONS & THE FALLACY OF 
THE “ADAM SMITH PROBLEM”
Ross Witte
ABSTRACT
 This paper investigates Adam Smith’s intricate vision of human motivation 
and seeks to expose the fallacy of the “Adam Smith Problem”.  Through an 
expansive study of the famed economist’s two most prominent works, An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (WN) and The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (TMS), I will show that the two are perfect complements of one 
other and that Adam Smith did not set down in one place his views on the nature 
of man (Coase, 1).  Adam Smith saw man for what he truly is, dominated by self-
interest but not without concern for others, able to reason but not necessarily able 
to reach the best or right conclusion while all the time seeing one’s own actions 
through a veil of self-delusion.  WN and TMS are equally important books, and in 
order to understand the economics and philosophy of Adam Smith, both must be 
read and studied.
INTRODUCTION
 Adam Smith’s two most prominent works, An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (WN) and The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), 
are to many economists and philosophers, very different, and even contradictory 
in the way each defines and advances the concept of human motivation.  This 
notion of contradiction has led to the creation of what is referred to as the “Adam 
Smith Problem.” Many economists and philosophers alike have used these so-
called contradictions and inconsistencies to attack the authorial integrity of Adam 
Smith’s work, their main argument being that WN is built on self-interest and TMS 
is built on altruism and sympathy.  This argument presumes a single motivation, 
one of either self-interest or altruism.  This idea that human behavior rests upon 
a single motivating factor, regardless of which you believe, seems incredibly 
simplistic and naïve.  This paper will explain Smith’s intricate vision of human 
motivation through an expansive study of his two most prominent works.  It will 
argue that WN and TMS are perfect complements of one another and that Adam 
Smith did not set down in one place his views on the nature of man (Coase, 1).  
Section one of this paper will be a detailed discussion of why it is difficult 
to know exactly what Smith meant in his writings, particularly in today’s modern 
context, and why the concept of the “Adam Smith Problem” ever came to be. 
Section two will briefly discuss the book, Adam’s Fallacy: a Guide to Economic 
Theology, and will develop the book as a reference point for the later sections 
when discussing the frequent misinterpretations and misrepresentations of Adam 
Smith’s writing.  Section three will begin to unravel the complex relationship 
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between altruism, or benevolence, and self-interest.  Section four will investigate 
Adam Smith’s view of man.  Section five will specifically scrutinize the concept 
of the “impartial spectator.”  Section six will discuss the importance of both 
benevolence and self-interest in the capitalist economic system, and the final 
section, section seven, will be the conclusion and summation of the findings.
READING ADAM SMITH
 The meaning of a word lies in its use (Tribe, 617).  Words, more than 
anything else, tell us a person’s opinions, feelings, and intentions.  However, when 
it comes to understanding the writings of a person who is deceased, and who has 
left little behind besides their works to let us know who they were, there lies an 
inherent risk of interpreting the person’s writings incorrectly.  Without the person 
being there to explain his/her meaning, misinterpretation is bound to happen on 
a variety of scales.  This problem is compounded if you are trying to understand 
and interpret the writings of someone who died over 200 years ago.  Without the 
right historical context, it is extremely hard to understand the writer’s motivations 
and the circumstances that shape his/her opinion.
Adam Smith is one of the greatest victims of this misinterpretation and 
misrepresentation.  Smith’s reputation as the father of modern economics will 
most likely endure the test of time, and that is a title with which many would 
agree.  The problem is not the title however, but the concepts that are associated 
with the name Adam Smith.
 The canonical status of WN has survived successive revisions, with 
associated adjustments in emphasis and interpretation to what the name “Smith” 
stands for along the way (Tribe, 609).  Economic and historical journals continue 
to publish articles dealing with particular aspects of Smith’s contributions, with 
Smith’s concepts broached by the understanding of Smith as an “economic 
liberal.”  Famed economist George Stigler once noted that WN is a “stupendous 
palace erected upon the granite of self-interest” (Tribe, 622).  This common 
understanding of Smith offers vindication of his arguments for natural liberty, 
self-interest, and laissez-faire.  However, this understanding of Smith is incorrect 
due to how the term “self-interest” was used by Smith in his time versus how the 
term is understood today.  
Adam Smith understood self-interest as the awareness and care of one’s 
own well-being.  Today’s understanding of the term “self-interest” implies an 
inherent selfishness that goes beyond one’s care for their personal well-being and 
enters the realm of greed.  Therefore, the perception of Smith, which is largely 
based on the misinterpretation on what Smith meant by self-interest, set forth by 
economists such as Stigler, is extremely simplistic and naïve, something that has 
been recognized by economists, historians, philosophers, and psychologists over 
the past fifty or so years.
The understanding of WN has been expanded, and a more sophisticated 
image has emerged.  Four broad trends can be distinguished in recent studies. 
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First, there is the conventional appraisal of Smithian analysis by historians of 
economics.  The second tendency is for historians to locate Smith’s writing in a 
wider cultural and political context.  The third trend reconstructs the eighteenth-
century Smith as a critic of twentieth-century economies.  And lastly, the fourth 
trend emphasizes a “cultural-historical” Smith, which makes him more accessible 
to analysis to those whose domain of work has recently shifted away from 
“literature” towards a general study of textual politics (Tribe, 610).
Recent interpretations of Smith have drawn upon some of his other 
writings besides WN and TMS.  Until recently, the world’s understanding of 
Smith’s contributions had been shaped by two centuries of commentary, based 
almost exclusively on WN and TMS, where the textual foundation for this 
commentary had been altered through misinterpretation.  To appreciate how recent 
interpretation differs from older understanding, one needs to know something of 
the biography of Smith’s work (Tribe, 610).
In 1752, Smith was appointed Chief of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow. 
His Glasgow lectures were the origins of both WN and TMS.  As stated earlier, 
however, Smith’s reputation is primarily based on WN - a reputation that links him 
directly to classical economics.  In accordance, the book was read as a series of 
propositions about employment, the benefits of freedom of commerce, the nature 
of capital accumulation, and a rebuttal of Physiocratic and Mercantilist systems 
of economic thought (Tribe, 613).
German scholars sought to broaden their understanding of Smith by 
comparing the psychological assumptions of WN and TMS.  These scholars 
found the assumptions of the two works contradictory, and thus the “Adam Smith 
Problem” was born.  Smith’s moral philosophy and economics were labeled 
incompatible by these German scholars, bringing into question whether Smith 
had held a unifying vision of civil society.  Whether or not this argument ever had 
merit will be discussed in depth later, but for now it is irrelevant.  What is relevant 
here is that there was a renewed interest in Smith’s work.  There was a broadening 
of understanding of Smith as an author and this led to the rediscovery of WN as a 
“history and a criticism of all European civilization” (Morrow, 157).
As stated earlier, recent works have used other writings by Smith to help 
understand the concepts of WN and TMS.  These lectures, notes, and correspondence 
however, have revealed little on his private thoughts and beliefs.  As a consequence, 
his published works remain the only chief resource to understanding his motives 
and intentions.  Nevertheless, the limited correspondence, lectures, and essays that 
have been discovered have been able to provide a new context for the rereading 
of WN (Tribe, 615).  The question is, how should one go about rereading Smith? 
This will be discussed in the following sections.
A common argument used by economists when it comes to reading 
Adam Smith is that Smith’s relevance to us is a function of the degree to which 
his arguments retain their validity, propositions advanced by Smith being directly 
applicable to, and testable against, modern issues (Friedman, 7-8).  This is a very 
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ahistorical approach.  It should be noted however, that when most economists 
decide to write on a given subject, histories of economics are generally written 
by economists for other economists (Tribe, 615).  Here, economists use language 
and other familiar economic tools, which then leads to groups of writings that are 
all addressing the same issue and reviewing the same information.  The approach 
of the historian, as mentioned earlier, is a new way to look at economics, because 
the historians’ reconstruction of past events and arguments presumes that their 
significance and meaning is not immediately accessible to us, therefore eliminating 
an easy, generic answer.  This allows people to learn to think about Adam Smith 
as something other than a proto-neoclassical economist, and allows us to discover 
new and more meaningful ways of making use of our knowledge of markets, 
politics, and wealth (Tribe, 616).
The problem with this historical approach is that it is limited in its 
ability to understand Smith.  This approach attempts to establish a connection 
between modern economics and past writings, which creates problems because 
what Adam Smith was writing about in the eighteenth century has a completely 
different context if it is applied to today’s economy.  We learn more from Smith 
by not converting him into a twentieth-century critic, but by understanding him 
rather as an eighteenth-century moralist (Tribe, 629).  In addition, not all of his 
writings are given equal status, as mentioned earlier (WN being the dominant 
work studied and quoted).  His lectures and correspondence are widely ignored, 
and only those sections of TMS that can be directly brought into relation with 
the economic themes of WN tend to be mentioned (Tribe, 616).  If we are to 
understand what Smith is saying properly, then one cannot impose upon his works 
our modern understanding of economics, language, and politics.  This historical 
approach to writing intellectual history however, does allow for a more in depth 
study of economic and political language during Smith’s time.
Another important development in the focus on language in economics is 
associated with the “linguistic turn” in humanities.  This method subjects economic 
arguments to analysis with instruments that are usually found in the hands of 
literary theorists, instruments such as style, metaphor, and narrative (Tribe, 618). 
The purpose is to emphasize that all discourse deploys strategies of persuasion. 
Smith treated the domain of rhetoric as equivalent to human communication, and 
therefore a pathway to an understanding of human motivation (Tribe, 618).  This 
focus directs our attention to the manner in which use of language uses “facts” as 
devices to make an argument legitimate.
New historical and linguistic avenues have opened the possibility of the 
reconstruction of the world’s understanding of Adam Smith.  These are derived 
from the study of modern political theory, which concluded that Smith was not 
just an economist, but a theorist of civilization and human conduct.  Smith is 
an analyst of commercial society, ethics, and social progress, something that 
conventional histories of economics has neglected (Tribe, 619).
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A NON-CAPITALIST MISINTERPRETATION OF SMITH
 There are many misinterpretations of Adam Smith and his overwhelming 
contributions to the study of economics and philosophy.  Much of this paper will 
criticize the misinterpretations of capitalist/free market economists; however, 
these economists are not the only ones doing the misinterpreting.  In this section, 
I examine a recent misrepresentation.  The work in question is titled Adam’s 
Fallacy:  a Guide to Economic Theology and it is written by institutionalist 
economist Duncan K. Foley.
According to the author, Adam’s fallacy “lies in the idea that it is possible 
to separate an economic sphere of life, in which the pursuit of self-interest is guided 
by objective laws to a socially beneficent outcome, from the rest of social life, in 
which the pursuit of self-interest is morally problematic and has to be weighed 
against other ends” (Foley, xiii).  The author notes that Smith is alleged to have 
argued that the consistent pursuit of self-interest would lead to beneficial social 
outcomes, and Foley suggests that this perspective has become the dominating 
principle of modern economics, which sees Smith as its founder (Foley, xiii).
 There are many fundamental problems with the author’s claim and the 
only fallacy here is Foley’s.  First, at no point does Adam Smith ever suggest that 
there are two separate spheres of life, one being economic and one being social. 
Although the concept of self-interested behavior equaling increased social wealth 
and well-being is all too commonly associated with Smith, it was not Smith who 
created this idea.  Adam Smith at no point states that the pursuit of self-interest 
will always lead to the betterment of society.  This was first argued by Bernard 
Mandeville in his work Fable of the Bees, which was strongly criticized by Smith. 
Mandeville believed benevolence did absolutely no social good.  In response, 
Smith’s opening sentence for TMS was this:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently 
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune 
of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though 
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. 
(Smith, 1790; par.1, pt.1, sec.1, ch.1)
As we can see from the opening passage of TMS, Smith was certainly not a 
believer in the strict and narrow concept that only self-interest served in generating 
social wealth, but that he believed benevolence played a vital role in human 
motivation.
In addition, Foley makes the following claim that what made Smith’s 
book unique was its ability to “put forward a clear vision of how capitalist society 
might develop” and to address:
more directly than anyone else the central anxiety that besets 
capitalism - the question of how to be a good person and live 
a good and moral life within the antagonistic, impersonal, and 
self-regarding social relations that capitalism imposes...By 
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being selfish within the rules of capitalist property relations, 
Smith promises, we are actually being good to our fellow 
human beings. (Foley, 2)
This is the crux of Adam’s fallacy and “neither Smith nor any of his successors 
has been able to demonstrate rigorously and robustly how private selfishness turns 
into public altruism” (Foley, 3).  This again is a severe misinterpretation that is 
solely based on the common misconceptions of WN , and holds no reference to 
TMS, which, makes this claim uninformed and more importantly irresponsible.
The third problem with Foley’s argument is that he insists that Smith is 
to blame for the savagery and competitiveness of today’s capitalistic economies. 
Whether or not one believes in capitalism as the best economic model is another 
debate in and of itself and is not an important question for this paper.  What 
is important to think about is whether it is correct to blame someone for the 
misinterpretations of their work or does the blame lie on the shoulders of those 
scholars who are doing the misinterpreting.  What we are seeing here is the classic 
mistake of reading Smith is if he were a modern day economist.  Due to this 
critical mistake, Foley, an institutionalist, arrives at many of the same erroneous 
conclusions free market capitalists have traditionally arrived at when reading 
Smith.
Foley’s Adam’s Fallacy: a Guide to Economic Theology is an important 
example because it demonstrates the depth of the misinterpretation of Adam Smith. 
The majority of this paper is dedicated to criticizing the misinterpretations of free 
market capitalists, who in all respects view Smith as the godfather of economics. 
Foley is an institutionalist, who is very critical of Smith and his assumed role in 
the current state of capitalism.  However, as I have noted here, Foley trips over the 
same misinterpretations that the capitalists do, demonstrating just how critical it is 
to address this issue of the “Adam Smith Problem.”
THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALTRUISM & 
SELF-INTEREST
 The first step in dissecting Smith’s complex relationship between altruism 
and self-interest is to understand his system of natural liberty.  Smith’s system of 
natural liberty is built on two key assumptions - one at the individual level and one 
at the social level.  At the individual level, Smith said that society is composed of 
individuals who are all similar and are guided by an innate human propensity to 
trade and pursue self-interest.  On the social level, Smith said that this system, to 
the extent that it accommodates human nature and to the extent that it establishes 
social harmony through economic growth, is an ideal social order: 
All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being 
thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of 
natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, 
as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly 
free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both 
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his industry and capital into competition with those of any other 
man, or order of men.  (Smith, 1776: 51)
These two assumptions are the pillars that hold together Smith’s beliefs and 
theories, and are particularly important in understanding how WN was written.  
WN was written as an analysis of the social phenomena he saw during the 
Industrial Revolution that arose due to self-interest.  At no point in WN, however, 
does Smith suggest that self-interest is the single motivating factor of all human 
beings.  WN was an attempt to find a basis on which people could live together 
when the Church no longer provided an unquestioned set of answers to inquiries 
about how society should be organized (Backhouse, 132).  In addition, Smith was 
exploring how commercial society could prosper as a whole, even when men 
were pursuing their own self-interest (Backhouse, 123).  By doing this, Smith 
could suspend morality when answering economic questions and create a model 
where economic growth was possible.
Some economists, including Jacob Viner, believe that the most important 
inconsistency between TMS and WN is that in TMS, Smith assumes that there 
exists a natural harmony, and in WN, Smith abandons this belief.  I believe this 
is due to a gross misunderstanding of the two works.  First, it should be noted 
that TMS is not an abstract treatise upon virtuous conduct, but a study of human 
psychology.  It was written to show how self-interest, mitigated by sympathy and 
self-command, can result in prudent and sometimes beneficent actions (Tribe, 622). 
In comparison, WN’s purpose was to explain how commercial societies originate 
and create wealth.  Put simply, WN is a study of the organization of economic 
life.  It should be understood however, that Smith does not analyze how they are 
governed (Tribe, 623).  As we can now see, TMS and WN are composed according 
to two very distinct forms of rhetorical strategy and the claim of inconsistency 
between the two books in regards to natural harmony is a weak claim at best.
Of course, there are other so-called inconsistencies other economists 
have pointed to over the years.  One important claim is that in TMS, human action 
is influenced by benevolence and in WN this is absent.  As mentioned before, this 
is the most common reason given for the creation of the “Adam Smith Problem.” 
Economists who believe this claim commonly cite the following passage:  “It is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our own dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.  We address ourselves, 
not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own 
necessities but of their advantages” (Smith, 1776: 14).  What these economists 
forget is what Smith says earlier in the same paragraph, that in a civilized society, 
man needs cooperation and assistance of great multitudes, because in his whole 
life he is going to only find a few friends (Smith, 1776: 14).  Here, the intertwined 
nature of altruism and self-interest can be seen, and in order to understand it, 
Smith’s view of man needs to be understood.
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SMITH’S VIEW OF MAN
Adam Smith’s view of man and human nature are important in helping 
us to understand his economics.  For better or for worse, Smith is most famous 
for his development of the case for laissez-faire, the concept that government 
should not control economic activity.  According to Smith, an economic system is 
governed by natural laws and is driven by prudence and the pursuit of self-interest. 
As stated earlier however, Smith never says self-interest is the sole motivating 
factor behind human behavior.  This points out the main flaw in the creation of the 
Adam Smith Problem, because this problem presumes a single motivation, one of 
self-interest or altruism, a concept that relies on two extremes and does not give 
room for multiple motivations.
Smith’s writings actually point out that there are multiple motivating 
factors in human behavior.  Smith asserts that people do not only rely on the 
benevolence of others and that it is quite possible to be self-interested and have 
other concerns as well. Self-interest and benevolence have a multifaceted and 
complementary relationship with one another, something of which Smith is well 
aware and fully expects the reader to understand.
According to the writings of Adam Smith, sympathy is the basis for 
people’s concerns for others.  We form our idea of how others feel by considering 
how we would feel in like circumstances (Coase, 2).  This concept refers back to 
the earlier section of the paper which discusses the vast differences between the 
writings of Bernard Mandeville and Adam Smith and how Smith believed that 
both self-interest and benevolence play a vital role in human motivation.  Put 
simply, if one realizes that something is making another person unhappy, that 
realization makes oneself unhappy and vice versa.  These feelings of sympathy 
are strengthened by the fact the mutual sympathy is in itself a pleasure.  “Nothing 
pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions 
of our own breast” (Smith, 1790; par.1, pt.1, sec.1, ch. 2).  Because of this, humans 
are led to see ourselves as others see us.
Next, Smith investigates human nature when it comes to one’s own well-
being, whether it be financially or dealing with one’s health, when compared to 
that of a complete stranger.  Smith states that the loss or gain of a small interest of 
one’s own appears vastly more important than the greatest concerns of a complete 
stranger.  Smith provides a great hypothetical example of this conundrum in TMS, 
where he points out that if a man from Europe were to hear of a great disaster in 
China, where a hundred million people lost their lives, he would feel an initial 
sorrow for the people and might stay in a melancholy state for a time, but would 
sooner than later go back to his normal business:
Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads 
of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, 
and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who 
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had no sort of connexion with that part of the world, would be 
affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. 
He would, I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his 
sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would 
make many melancholy reflections upon the precariousness 
of human life, and the vanity of all the labours of man, which 
could thus be annihilated in a moment. He would too, perhaps, 
if he was a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings 
concerning the effects which this disaster might produce upon 
the commerce of Europe, and the trade and business of the world 
in general. And when all this fine philosophy was over, when 
all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, 
he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose 
or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquillity, as if no 
such accident had happened. The most frivolous disaster which 
could befal himself would occasion a more real disturbance. 
(Smith, 1790; par.4, pt.3, ch.3)
Smith goes on to say that if that same person were to know that he would 
lose his little finger the following day, the man would not be able to sleep 
all night.  As stated earlier, the man knowing of the tremendous loss in 
China would snore throughout the night, and in all likelihood would not 
give the disaster a second thought.
Smith suggests two reasons for this.  The first is one of self-interest, 
which is discussed within the context of the story.  The second reason is that 
every individual is naturally more attached to his own society than to any other. 
Smith’s argument here is that benevolence is strongest within the family, and 
as one moves further and further down the line, away from family and friends, 
we do not only see an absence of benevolence but the presence of malevolence. 
Smith believes benevolence operates weakly when dealing with strangers and I 
am strongly inclined to believe him.
Nevertheless, many economists would view Smith’s example as a clear 
indicator that self-interest is the sole motivator in human decision making.  This 
statement however, completely ignores the subtlety of Adam Smith’s mind.  Smith 
follows up on his explanation of his previous example by asking the following 
question:  suppose that it were possible to prevent the loss of those hundred 
million lives by sacrificing his little finger, would a man of humanity be unwilling 
to make the sacrifice (Coase, 5)?  Smith answers this question by stating that 
while our passive feelings are almost always so selfish, our active principles often 
are generous.  He believes that it is not the soft power of humanity or a spark of 
benevolence in the heart that counteracts the strongest impulses of self-love, but 
it is a stronger, more powerful love of what is honorable and noble and the feeling 
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of superiority of our own characters (Smith, 1790; par.4, pt.3, ch.3).  Therefore, it 
is not the love of mankind that makes one willing to sacrifice, but it is because he/
she sees himself/herself through the eyes of an impartial spectator.
THE “IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR” & BOURGEOIS VIRTUE
 The concept of the “impartial spectator” is rooted in the writings of 
esteemed philosopher and political economist Bernard Mandeville.  According to 
Mandeville, an individual must take account of the desires of others in seeking to 
attain his or her own ends because these desires represent potential obstacles to the 
attainment of satisfaction (Tribe, 621).  Smith took this concept from Mandeville 
and expanded and modified it into his own idea of the “impartial spectator.”  Smith’s 
model illustrated a system of social reciprocity, where each person judges others 
as a spectator.  According to Smith, society acts like a mirror where all actions 
are rehearsed and conduct is governed by an internalized construct, the impartial 
spectator.  Therefore with this understanding of Smith’s impartial spectator, we 
can deduce that the Smithian conception of self-interest is not an injunction to act 
without moral scruple.  Instead, it is embedded within the framework of social 
reciprocity, which allows for the formation of moral judgment (Tribe, 621).
 Smith, however, was not oblivious to the fact that some individuals would 
be less responsive to the promptings of the impartial spectator.  Smith argued that 
individuals tend to think more highly of themselves than what is really warranted. 
“We are all naturally disposed to overrate the excellencies of our own character” 
(Smith, 1790; par.34, pt.3, ch.2).  Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, Smith did 
not believe that these introverted feelings left people unable to act sensibly or 
morally, and this desire to act morally is reflected in the codes of conduct seen 
throughout society.  The “impartial spectator” is then embodied in the codes of 
conduct that individuals and societies create.  We conform to the codes of conduct 
because we wish to be admired by others.  According to Smith, we not only have a 
desire to be approved of, we also wish to be what is approved of in others (Smith, 
1790; par.7, pt.3, ch.2).  The liberty on which commercial society is based implies 
a moral order that links the individual to sociability.
The notion of the “impartial spectator” is seen in both WN and TMS.  The 
problem, however, is that this concept is seen by many as the foundation of TMS 
but not WN.  The reason for this problem lies with their misinterpretation of the 
“impartial spectator” as an all-knowing guide instead of seeing it as an evaluation 
tool for judgment.  Put simply, the concept of the “impartial spectator” is not an 
effective way to analyze economic decision-making by itself.  This is not to say 
that morality does not play a role in economic deliberation, but there are many 
other factors, such as the effect it has on your family, the repercussions it will have 
on the local, state, or global market, and how it will affect your relationships, that 
go into making a sound and beneficial economic decision.  TMS argues in favor 
of this as well, arguing that the greatest cause of corruption of moral sentiments 
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is admiration for the rich.  The concept of “impartial spectator” by its very nature 
counters the economic desires of people.
There is a link, however, between the “impartial spectator” and economics. 
It is a link between culture and economy; this is known as a “bourgeois virtue.” 
What is meant by bourgeois virtue is not an apology for every mistake; Smith 
was opposed to the reduction of ethics to greedy interest.  Adam Smith’s intention 
was to create an ethical system for the bourgeoisie (McCloskey, 301).  Smith, of 
course, did not approve of all the activities of the bourgeoisie, and he noted that 
the interests of the bourgeoisie are “always in some respects different from, and 
even opposite to, that of the public” (Smith, 1776: 267).  Therefore, prudence and 
solidarity are needed for a commercial society to work.  It should be easy to see 
how prudence depends on solidarity, but it should also be noted that solidarity 
depends just as much on prudence.  Who we are depends on what we do and 
our ethics depend on our business (McCloskey, 310).  What this means is that 
commerce is capable of teaching ethics.  Most economists would disagree with 
this statement, believing that the ethics of the bourgeoisie erode virtue.
I believe Adam Smith would disagree with these economists, because 
overall the virtues of the bourgeois are the virtues that are necessary for commerce 
and government.  The uncertainty and skepticism of trade is common in the 
market.  Therefore, the “dogma of doubt” is an important bourgeois virtue and an 
attitude that is perfectly suited for the vagaries of the marketplace (McCloskey, 
311).  Charity is another bourgeois virtue and is founded in the bourgeois norm of 
reciprocity.  Bourgeois virtue is capable of keeping bourgeois vice in check.  This 
process is what creates transactions between people.  Nowadays, in rich countries, 
about a quarter of national income is earned from merely bourgeois and feminine 
persuasion (McCloskey, 312).  In addition, division of labor is the consequence of 
propensity and it is the necessary consequence of reason of speech (Smith, 1776: 
25).  Smith also referred to speech as the characteristic faculty of human nature 
(Smith, 1790; par.25, pt.7, sec.4).  The bourgeoisie work with their mouths and 
are proof of the importance of communication.  Therefore, according to Smith, 
there are many characteristics of the bourgeoisie that are, in fact, good.
BENEVOLENCE, SELF-INTEREST & THEIR ROLE IN CAPITALISM
 Adam Smith was not a strict advocate of laissez faire as so many believe 
him to be.  Smith saw that self-interest and competition were sometimes treacherous 
to the public interest they were supposed to serve, and he was prepared to have 
government exercise some measure of control over them where the need could be 
shown and the competence of government for the task demonstrated (Viner, 231-
232).  He knew that laissez-faire could be both good and bad.
 It is in my opinion that capitalism is the hope of the poor of the world; 
therefore capitalism cannot be unethical or bad in nature.  Capitalism needs to take 
the bourgeois virtues seriously and nurture society.  The world market is run by 
the bourgeoisie; therefore bourgeois virtue cannot be ignored.  This is the Adam 
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Smith that emerges when careful attention is paid to his readings.  Commonly 
believed metaphors, such as the treatment of the “invisible hand” as a metaphor 
for the price mechanism, need to be seen in a new light.  The invisible hand 
should now also be viewed as an allusion to the manner in which self-interest 
and sociability combine to render commercial society virtuous and prosperous 
(Tribe, 627).  The connection between commerce and liberty can be seen in the 
interaction of free individuals in the pursuit of their own interests and how that 
brings an increase in the wealth of all.
Seen in this light, Smith’s argument for the use of the market for the 
organization of economic activity is very strong.  The greatest advantage of the 
market is that it is able to use the strength of self-interest to offset the weakness 
and partiality of benevolence (Coase, 28).  One should not forget however, the 
role that benevolence and moral sentiments play in making the market system 
possible.  As Smith notes, society cannot exist among those who are ready to hurt 
and injure one another at all times (Smith, 1776: 325).
CONCLUSION
 More so than anything else, after reading this paper one should see that 
the relationship between benevolence and self-interest is a complex one.  Section 
one of this paper explained the reasons behind the misrepresentations of Smith 
and why the concept of the “Adam Smith Problem” was ever conceived.  We 
saw that the canonical status of WN has distorted the world’s perception of Smith 
and his ideas on human motivation and that in order to read Smith correctly, one 
must take into account all of his writings.  Section two used Duncan K. Foley’s 
book Adam’s Fallacy: a Guide to Economic Theology to point out the depth of 
the misinterpretations of Adam Smith’s work.  We saw here that it is not only 
capitalists who have misread and misused Smith’s writings, but even economists 
who believe in other economic systems, like Foley, are fumbling over the same 
passages and making the same mistakes.  In section three we delved deeper 
into the multifaceted relationship of benevolence and self-interest, pulling apart 
passages in both works in order to understand how the two books do not counter, 
but complement each other.  Section four took a look at Adam Smith’s view of 
human nature and shows that there is a balance and connection between self-
love and benevolence and that people are capable of a wide range of emotions 
depending upon how it affects them and the people they are close to.  Section five 
put specific emphasis on Smith’s concept of the “impartial spectator” and how 
this model is used to understand human motivation and action better.  Section six 
attempted to show how benevolence and self-interest work in capitalism and how 
the two affect the marketplace.  Here, we saw that both benevolence and self-
interest have dynamic roles in the creation and running of the marketplace.
 There is nothing in Smith’s writings to suggest that the Adam Smith 
Problem is legitimate.  I believe any person can see the fallacies of the Adam 
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Smith Problem if they read WN and TMS thoughtfully and carefully.  Of course 
we all hold biases, but if we look only at the words of Adam Smith and fight the 
tendency to generalize him as a pure economic liberal who paved the way for 
laissez-faire economics and self-interest (in today’s language), we can see Smith 
and the message of his writings in the right light.
 Adam Smith saw man for what he truly is, dominated by self-interest 
but not without concern for others, able to reason but not necessarily able to 
reach the best or right conclusion while all the time seeing one’s own actions 
through a veil of self-delusion.  According to Smith, a person can have both self-
interested and altruistic motivations for his/her actions.  At no point does Smith 
suggest that there is a clear and single reason for mankind’s motives, and the only 
reason the “Adam Smith Problem” was conceived is due to a class of radicals, 
many of whom wanted to explain social phenomena without reference to a deity, 
who separated WN from moral philosophy because it acquired a more scientific 
character (Backhouse, 132).  WN and TMS are equally important books, and in 
order to understand the economics and philosophy of Adam Smith, both must be 
read and studied.
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